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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DEBRA MEENDERINK,
Petitioner/Appellee,
vs.

Appeal No. 20050466

STEVEN MEENDERINK,
Respondent /Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78-2a-3 (h).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I. SHOULD THE SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PAYMENTS
RECEIVED BY THE CHILDREN FROM RESPONDENT'S SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY ACCOUNT BE CREDITED TOWARD HIS CHILD SUPPORT
OBLIGATION?
Although we generally review the determination to modify a divorce decree
for an abuse of discretion, insofar as that determination is based on a conclusion
of law, we review it for correctness. Krambule v. Krambule. 1999 UT App 357
f l O , 994 P.2d 210 cert denied, 4 P.3rd 1289 (Utah 2000).
The Court of Appeals reviews the district court's decision for correctness to
the extent it involves questions of statutory interpretation. Ball v. Peterson. 912

P.2d 1006, 1009 Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Ordinarily, the use of the word "shall" in a statute creates a mandatory
condition, eliminating any discretion on the part of the courts. See, e.g., Office of
the Guardian Ad Litem v. Anderson. 1999 UT App 251 ,U 10, 987 P.2d 611; Keith
v. Rizzuto. 212 F.3d 1190, 1193 n. 3 (10th Cir.2000) (" 'It is a basic canon of
statutory construction that the use of the word "shall" indicates a mandatory
intent'" (quoting United States v. Mvers. 106 F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir.1997)).
Dienerv.Diener. 98 P.3d 1178,1182, 2004 UT App 314, f l 2 (Utah App. 2004).
This issue was preserved by the Respondent's Motion and Memorandum to
Alter or Amend Judgment and for Further Findings and Request for Hearing.
(R465-480). The relevant statute, Utah Code Section 78-45-7.5(8)(b) was
entered as Respondent's Exhibit 13 A 13-14, supporting Respondent's argument
that the children's payments should be credited against Respondent's child
support obligation.
II. THE FINDINGS REGARDING LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF
CIRCUMSTANCES WERE INSUFFICIENT UNDER UTAH CODE ANN §78-457.2 INSOFAR AS THEY ADDRESSED THE PARTIES' INCOMES AND
PETITIONER'S INCOME SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN THE CHILD
SUPPORT CALCULATIONS AND WORKSHEET.
"We review a determination on whether a substantial change of
circumstances has been shown for abuse of discretion." Mancil v. Smith. 2000
UTApp. 378, 18P.3d509, 511.
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"Our Standard of Review in divorce proceedings allows us to disturb the
action of the trial court only when the evidence clearly preponderates to the
contrary or the trial court has abused its discretion or misapplied principles of
law." Weise v. Weise, 699 P.2d 700, (Utah 1985). Subject to those limitations,
we are free to review both the facts and the law. Openshaw v. Qpenshaw. 639
P.2d 177, 178 (1981); Christensen v. Christensen. 628 P.2d 1297, (1981).
"Ordinarily we accord the trial court considerable discretion in adjusting the
financial interests of divorced parties and thus, 'the court's actions are entitled to
a presumption of validity.'" Hansen v. Hansen. 736 P.2d 1055 (Utah Ct. App.
1987). However, where the court has abused its discretion in apportioning those
financial responsibilities, we cannot affirm that determination. Id. One such
abuse we have recognized in this area of law is the failure to enter specific,
detailed findings supporting each of the factors which must be considered when
making a child support award. With this standard in mind, we analyze the
adequacy of the court's findings in this case. Allred v. Allred. 797 P.2d 1108,
1111, (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
The issue was preserved by closing arguments addressing both parties'
incomes and by Respondent filing an objection to the proposed Findings of Fact
and Order. Both parties anticipated a hearing in which the issue would be further
explored. The court denied the request for hearing. Further, under URCP Rule
52 (b), Amendment:
-3-

. . . . When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court
without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party
raising the question has made in the district court an objection to
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion
for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
III. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE ACTUAL JUDGMENT FOR
CHILD SUPPORT AND THE ARREARAGE WAS CALCULATED
INCORRECTLY.
In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellant must marshal
the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the
clear weight of the evidence. Main Street v. Easy Heat Inc.. 2004 UT 72 U 69, 99
P.3d801.
A trial court's findings are adequate only if they are "sufficiently detailed
and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Mancil v. Smith. 18 P. 3d 509,
511, 2000 UTApp. 378.
The issue was preserved by filing an Objection to the Proposed Findings of
Fact and Order. Both parties anticipated a hearing in which the issue would be
further explored. The court denied the request for hearing. Further, Respondent
relies on URCP Rule 52. (Supra page 3-4).

-4-

IV. WERE ATTORNEY FEES PROPERLY AWARDED AND SHOULD
ATTORNEY FEES BE AWARDED IF APPELLANT IS SUCCESSFUL ON
APPEAL?
"Trial Courts are afforded broad discretion in deciding whether to award
attorney fees and costs in modification proceedings." Wilde v. Wilde. 35P.3d
341, 348; 2001 UT App. 318 "Where a trial court may exercise broad discretion,
we presume the correctness of the court's decision absent 'manifest injustice or
inequity that indicates a clear abuse of discretion." id.
In order to award attorney fees, the trial court must find (1) the requesting
party is in need of financial assistance; (2) the requested fees are reasonable;
and (3) the other spouse has the ability to pay. Bolliaer v. Bolliqer 997 P.2d 903,
909; 2000 UT App 47. It is within the appellate court's discretion to award fees
on appeal.
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES
Rules
URCP Rule 52, Findings by the Court; Amendment... When findings of fact are
made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the
party raising the question had made in the district court an objection to such
findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a
motion for a new trial.
Statutes
Utah Code Ann. 78-45-4. Duty of woman.
(1) Every woman shall support her child and every child shall be presumed to be
-5-

in need of the support of his mother. Every woman shall support her husband
when he is in need.
(2) Except as limited in a court order under Section 30-3-5, 30-4-3, or 78-45-7.15:
(a) The expenses incurred on behalf of a minor child for reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses, and other necessities are chargeable
upon the property of both parents, regardless of the marital status of the parents.
(b) Either or both parents may be sued by a creditor for the expenses described
in Subsection (2)(a) incurred on behalf of minor children.
Amended by Chapter 161, 2000 General Session
Utah Code Ann. 78-45-7.Determination of amount of support - Rebuttable guidelines.
(1) (a) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by prior court
order unless there has been a substantial change of circumstance on the part of
the obligor or obligee or adjustment under Subsection 78-45-7.2(6) has been made,
(b) If the prior court order contains a stipulated provision for the automatic
adjustment for prospective support, the prospective support shall be the amount
as stated in the order, without a showing of a material change of circumstances, if
the stipulated provision:
(1) is clear and unambiguous;
(ii) is self-executing;
(iii) provides for support which equals or exceeds the base child support award
required by the guidelines; and
(iv) does not allow a decrease in support as a result of the obligor's voluntary
reduction of income.
(2) If no prior court order exists, a substantial change in circumstances has
occurred, or a petition to modify an order under Subsection 78-45-7.2(6) has
been filed, the court determining the amount of prospective support shall require
each party to file a proposed award of child support using the guidelines before
an order awarding child support or modifying an existing award may be granted.
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court shall
establish support after considering all relevant factors, including but not limited to:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the ability of an incapacitated adult child to earn, or other benefits received by
the adult child or on the adult child's behalf including Supplemental Security Income;
(f) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child;
(g) the ages of the parties; and
(h) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of others.
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and assess all
-6-

arrearages based upon the Uniform Child Support Guidelines described in this
chapter.
Amended by Chapter 53,1998 General Session

Utah Code Ann. 78-45-7.2. Application of guidelines - Rebuttal.
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative order establishing or
modifying an award of child support entered on or after July 1,1989.
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable presumption
in establishing or modifying the amount of temporary or permanent child support,
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and considerations required
by the guidelines, the award amounts resulting from the application of the
guidelines, and the use of worksheets consistent with these guidelines are
presumed to be correct, unless rebutted under the provisions of this section.
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the conclusion
that complying with a provision of the guidelines or ordering an award amount
resulting from use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in the
best interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to rebut the presumption in
that case. If an order rebuts the presumption through findings, it is considered a
deviated order.
(4) The following shall be considered deviations from the guidelines, if:
(a) the order includes a written finding that it is a nonguidelines order;
(b) the guidelines worksheet has the box checked for a deviation and has an
explanation as to the reason; or
(c) the deviation was made because there were more children than provided for in
the guidelines table.
(5) If the amount in the order and the amount on the guidelines worksheet differ,
but the difference is less than $10, the order shall not be considered deviated and
the incomes listed on the worksheet may be used in adjusting support for emancipation.
(6) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent who live in the home of that
parent and are not children in common to both parties may at the option of either
party be taken into account under the guidelines in setting or modifying a child
support award, as provided in Subsection (7). Credit may not be given if:
(I) by giving credit to the obligor, children for whom a prior support order exists
would have their child support reduced; or
(ii) by giving credit to the obligee for a present family, the obligation of the obligor
would increase.
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared that compute the obligations of the
respective parents for the additional children. The obligations shall then be
subtracted from the appropriate parent's income before determining the award in
the instant case.
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(7) In a proceeding to modify an existing award, consideration of natural or
adoptive children born after entry of the order and who are not in common to both
parties may be applied to mitigate an increase in the award but may not be applied:
(a) for the benefit of the obligee if the credit would increase the support obligation
of the obligor from the most recent order; or
(b) for the benefit of the obligor if the amount of support received by the obligee
would be decreased from the most recent order.
(8) (a) If a child support order has not been issued or modified within the previous
three years, a parent, legal guardian, or the office may petition the court to adjust
the amount of a child support order.
(b) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (8)(a), the court shall, taking into
account the best interests of the child, determine whether there is a difference
between the amount ordered and the amount that would be required under the
guidelines. If there is a difference of 10% or more and the difference is not of a
temporary nature, the court shall adjust the amount to that which is provided for in
the guidelines.
(c) A showing of a substantial change in circumstances is not necessary for an
adjustment under Subsection (8)(b).
(9) (a) A parent, legal guardian, or the office may at any time petition the court to
adjust the amount of a child support order if there has been a substantial change
in circumstances.
(b) For purposes of Subsection (9)(a), a substantial change in circumstances may
include:
(I) material changes in custody;
(ii) material changes in the relative wealth or assets of the parties;
(iii) material changes of 30% or more in the income of a parent;
(iv) material changes in the ability of a parent to earn;
(v) material changes in the medical needs of the child; and
(vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities of either parent for the support of
others.
(c) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (9)(a), the court shall, taking into
account the best interests of the child, determine whether a substantial change
has occurred. If it has, the court shall then determine whether the change results
in a difference of 15% or more between the amount of child support ordered and
the amount that would be required under the guidelines. If there is such a
difference and the difference is not of a temporary nature, the court shall adjust
the amount of child support ordered to that which is provided for in the guidelines.
(10) Notice of the opportunity to adjust a support order under Subsections (8) and
(9) shall be included in each child support order issued or modified after July 1,
1997.
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Amended by Chapter 176, 2003 General Session
78-45-7.5 Determination of gross income - Imputed income.
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes:
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources,
except under Subsection (3); and
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents,
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust
income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, social security
benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment compensation, income
replacement disability insurance benefits, and payments from "nonmeans-tested"
government programs.
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one
full-time 40-hour job. However, if and only if during the time prior to the original
support order, the parent normally and consistently worked more than 40 hours at
his job, the court may consider this extra time as a pattern in calculating the
parent's ability to provide child support.
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are:
(a) cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter 3, Part 3, Family
Employment Program;
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training
Partnership Act, Supplemental Security Income, Social Security Disability
Insurance, Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance; and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business
shall be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for
self-employment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and
expenses from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to satisfy a
child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the business to
operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the
amount of business income determined for tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an
annual basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly
-9-

income.
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each parent
shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and complete copies
of tax returns from at least the most recent year unless the courtfindsthe
verification is not reasonably available. Verification of income from records
maintained by the Department of Workforce Services may be substituted for pay
stubs, employer statements, and income tax returns.
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether an
underemployment or overemployment situation exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection
(7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates
to the amount imputed, the party defaults, or, in contested cases, a hearing is
held and a finding made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history,
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar
backgrounds in the community, or the median earning for persons in the same
occupation in the same geographical area as found in the statistics maintained by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history or their occupation is unknown,
income shall be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work
week. To impute a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the
presiding officer in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of
fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist:
(I) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he cannot earn
minimum wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish
basic job skills; or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the custodial
parent's presence in the home.
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a minor child who is
the subject of a child support award nor benefits to a minor child in the child's own
-10-

right such as Supplemental Security Income.
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a
parent shall be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning record
it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation of that parent.
Other unearned income of a child may be considered as income to a parent
depending upon the circumstances of each case.

78-45-7.7. Calculation of obligations.
(1) Each parent's child support obligation shall be established in proportion to
their adjusted gross incomes, unless the low income table is applicable. Except
during periods of court-ordered parent-time as set forth in Section 78-45-7.11, the
parents are obligated to pay their proportionate shares of the base combined
child support obligation....
(2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and split custody as defined in
Section 8-45-2 and in cases where the obligor's adjusted gross income is $1,050
or less monthly, the base child support award shall be determined as follows:
(a) combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents and determine the base
combined child support obligation using the base combined child support
obligation table; and
(b) calculate each parent's proportionate share of the base combined child
support obligation by multiplying the combined child support obligation by each
parent's percentage of combined adjusted gross income.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Second District Court, State
of Utah, the Honorable Roger S. Dutson presiding.
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Decree of Divorce was entered February 09,1998.
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Respondent ("Steven") filed a Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce and
Motion for Order to Show Cause on July 12, 2001, asking for custody of the
oldest daughter, asking the court to reevaluate the child support based on the
changed incomes of the parties, and asking that Social Security Disability
Dependent payments made to the children be credited toward his child support
obligation..
An Order To Show Cause hearing was held on October 30, 2001. At that
hearing, the court found that Steven had SSDI income of $1333, and Debra had
employment income of $1430 per month. The child support was reduced from
$884 to $380, but was found to be satisfied by the SSDI disability payments
received by the children. (R67-68)
Steven objected to the Commissioner's ruling (R069-70), counting his SSDI
payments as "income" and a hearing on the objection was held on March 11,
2002. The Order on Objection was entered on April 30, 2002, finding that
Debra's income was $1440 per month, that Steven had 0 income and the child
support was set at $20 per month, satisfied by the children's SSDI payments.
This order was the order of the court during the pendency of the Petition to
Modify. (R167-169).
The parties appeared for trial on April 21, 2004. After receiving written
closing arguments from each party, the court took the matter under advisement.
-12-

The court entered a memorandum decision on August 31, 2004, and
instructed Debra's attorney to prepare the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order. R. 455-462.
On December 15, 2004, prior to receiving any proposed Findings of Fact
or final Order, Steven filed a Motion and Memorandum to Alter or Amend the
Judgment and requested a hearing. (R465-466, 467-480). Debra filed a
Response to Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment on January 20, 2005. (R484485). Steven filed a final response on January 25, 2005. (R486-488).
Debra submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Final Order in February 2005.
Steven filed an Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact and Order on
February 14, 2005. (R492-494)
On April 15, 2005 the court issued its Ruling, denying the Motion to Amend
the Findings of Facts, and dismissing the Petition to Modify the Decree of
Divorce. (R506-507).
On April 18, the trial court entered the Order Dismissing Petition to Modify
Decree of Divorce and Judgment (R508-520), and the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. (R521-524).
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III. DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW
On August 31, 2004 in its Memorandum, the court dismissed the Petition to
Modify Decree of Divorce, finding that there were no changed circumstances not
anticipated by the Decree of Divorce and denied Respondent's request to apply
the Social Security Disability Insurance payments from his account toward his
future child support obligations. Respondent filed his Motion to Amend or Alter
the Judgment in December 2004, as no formal findings of fact or order had been
presented. Formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were prepared by
Debra's counsel in February 2005. (R508-520). Respondent's counsel then filed
an Objection to the Findings of Fact and requested a hearing. (R492-494) The
court issued an additional Ruling (R504-505) denying the Motion to Alter or
Amend the Judgment and signed the Findings of Fact and Order on April 13,
2005 without granting a hearing. The trial court held firm on its decision not to
allow the children's Social Security Disability payments to be credited as child
support prospectively. The court entered a judgment for child support arrearage
of $17,377.74 among other judgments. (R507).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant (Father, "Steven") and Appellee (Mother, "Debra") were divorced
in February 09,1998. (R189-201). There were three minor children at the time of
the divorce.
-14-

Steven had been injured in a car accident on April 21, 1995 and had some
lingering problems, but was employed at the time of the divorce. Debra was not
employed at that time. Child support was based on Debra's income of $0 and
Steven's gross monthly income of $3,333. (R191) The support for Steven was
set at $884. (R040).
Debra remarried in February, 1998, within days of the divorce, thereby
losing her alimony. (T66, lines 14-24, & T191, 'lines 1-71).
In July, 1998, several months after entry of the divorce, Steven was injured
in a second car accident. This injury caused additional trauma to the original
injuries, eventually requiring surgery and a hip replacement in the year 1999.
(Exhibit R13D 1-3.)
The accident caused Steven to incur problems with pain on sitting and
standing, balance, walking, and right extremity numbness which persist to this
date. (T44-46, Exhibit R 13 D 5-7).
Steven ultimately lost his employment in December 1998 and effective
February 2000 re-qualified for Social Security Disability Income (SSDI). (T41).
Accordingly, the children were also made dependant beneficiaries of an SSDI

'The court incorrectly inferred in its memorandum decision that Debra had
a short-lived marriage in 2001, and lost her alimony at that time. R 510. Her
alimony actually terminated with her February 1998 remarriage. It is uncertain
whether that error impacted the court's decision on the other issues.
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payment, initially totaling 633 per month. (T41).
While unemployed, Steven fell behind in his child support. However the
parties signed an agreement in May 1999 which brought him current to May 15,
1999. (Exhibit R 14).
Debra began working after the divorce was finalized. She earned the
following wages: $9.00 per hour at the University of Utah; 11.00 per hour at
"Colors of Success" in Ogden Utah; and $10.45 per hour for Weber County
School District at different times since entry of the decree. (T224, 225).
Debra became engaged the summer of 2001, and temporarily moved to St.
George, Utah.
In August 2001, Steven filed a Petition To Modify the Divorce Decree
asking for custody of the oldest child and asking the court to re-evaluate the child
support, based on his disability and the changed incomes of both parents. (R04648). Steven further asked the court to credit the children's disability payments
from his account toward his child support obligation. (R048).
The parties first appeared before the domestic commissioner on October
30, 2001 for temporary orders. Steven objected to the commissioner's
recommendation counting his SSDI payments as income to him for child support
purposes. (R69-70) The parties then appeared before Judge Roger S. Dutson
on March 11, 2002 for the objection hearing. (R167-70).
-16-

In March 2002, in an "Order on Objection to Order to Show Cause", the
court found Debra to have an income of $1,440 per month. (R168).
The court further found that there had been a substantial change of
circumstances in Steven's income, and that Steven's SSDI income should not
count as income for child support purposes. No income was imputed to Steven.
(R168).
The court reserved the issue of Steven's ability to earn income for final
trial, and approved Steven's conduct of attending college classes in an effort to
become better qualified for new employment. A minimal child support obligation
of $20 per month, which was satisfied by the children's SSDI payments, was set
for the pendency of the matter. (R168).
Debra never filed a formal answer; however, on March 11, 2002 Debra filed
a new Order to Show Cause, claiming child support arrearage and medical
arrearage, and other financial claims against Steven. (R096-098). At the
hearing, the Commissioner reserved the issues for trial. (R165-166).
Steven failed to find employment after graduating from Weber State
College in 2003. (T 95, R 510-11) He was unable to land a job in his field as a
pharmaceutical representative. He eventually began taking more classes at
Weber State, working toward a teaching degree while he worked with the Utah
State Office of Rehabilitation to find suitable employment. (T97).
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At the time of trial Debra had voluntarily left her job at "Colors of Success"
which paid $1,440 per month and was working part time as a substitute teacher
earning $10.45 per hour and attending classes at Weber State University. (T224
lines 2-25).
At the time of trial, Steven was receiving $1,445 Social Security Disability
Income per month for himself while $672 "SSDI" Dependant Benefits were sent
to Debra for the minor children based on Steven's disability. (Exhibit R13 B 5556)
At trial, Debra brought claims against Steven for expenses for medical
care, and health insurance premiums for the children, claiming that her father had
directly paid certain expenses. (T201-202, 215, 238, Exhibits 1,8,& 9).
At trial, Steven provided opposing exhibits demonstrating direct payment of
child support to Debra in the amount of $16,842. (Exhibit R13 01-56). Debra did
not dispute the payments tendered by check, however, she disputed his claims of
all other cash payments (T210 lines 21-25).
The testimony of Debra's father Dan Favero, was proffered at trial, claiming
that he had paid for the children's medical expenses and other needs. (T202,
lines 15-24).
The court concluded the one day trial by ordering the parties to submit
written closing arguments. Written closing arguments were submitted to the court
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by both parties. (R308-359; 418-419).
The court issued its Memorandum on August 31, 2004 and ordered Debra's
attorney to prepare the Findings of Fact and Order. (R455-462)
On December 15, 2004, Steven filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
asking the court to reconsider the decision not to reduce Steven's child support
obligation by crediting the children's SSDI payments. (R465-66, 467-71). Debra
responded on January 20, 2005. (R484-485). Steven's final reply was filed on
January 25, 2005. (R486-488). The court did not issue an immediate ruling.
(R481).
Debra finally submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Order on February
11, 2005, despite the pending motion. Steven filed an Objection to the Proposed
Findings of Fact and Order on February 14, 2005. (R492-494). Debra did not
respond to the objection.
On April 15, 2005, the court denied Steven's Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment and Request for Hearing, and signed the proposed "Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law" and "Judgment and Order Dismissing Petition to Modify
Decree of Divorce".

(R495 -520).

Steven filed a Notice of Appeal on May 12, 2005, objecting to the court's
decisions regarding the Social Security Disability payments, the judgments for
child support arrearage and medical costs and requesting attorney fees. (R521).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I The trial court ignored the plain language of the statute and incorrectly
ruled that Steven's child support obligation would be $884 per month in addition
to the payments the children received from his SSDI. In this case, legislative
amendments in 1998 changed the language of Utah Code §78-45-7.5 (8)(b) to
read that "Social security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a
parent shall be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earnings
record it is based by crediting the amount against the potential child support."
Therefore, the court misapplied the law.
II The Trial court failed to make specific findings regarding each parent's
income for the child support calculations. The court disregarded the evidence
that Debra was now earning income, and did not include her income in the child
support calculations. Further the court did not specifically state what amount of
income Steven should be earning. Accordingly, the court failed to follow the
statutory process required under the Utah Code in calculating child support,
including each parent's obligation before finding there was no substantial change
of circumstances.
III The evidence does not support the actual judgment of child support for
$17,377.34. The judgment was incorrectly calculated under the terms of the
court's order. The findings of fact are insufficient to determine how the Social
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Security disability payments and cash payments were credited and how the court
reached the actual amount of arrearage.
IV The court awarded all attorney fees to Debra, having found that Steven
caused most of the fees and making general findings regarding need, ability to
pay and reasonableness of fees. However if Steven is successful on appeal, he
requests attorney fees.
ARGUMENT
ISSUES ON APPEAL
I. SHOULD THE SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PAYMENTS
RECEIVED BY THE CHILDREN FROM RESPONDENT'S SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY ACCOUNT BE CREDITED TOWARD HIS CHILD SUPPORT
OBLIGATION?
The trial court erred in its memorandum decision and Finding of Facts in
making the following Order:
From September 1, 2004, the child support amount payable will return
to the amount of $884 per month. Steven may deduct up to three
months future payments from his child support obligation for money
paid to the children by SSDI. However, Steven must obtain
employment within three months from the date of this memorandum or
Debra may retain any amount paid by SSDI for the benefit of the
children in addition to the $884 child support obligation payable by
Steven
Giving a credit to a parent for children's SSDI payments
received is discretionary with the Court under certain circumstances
such as exist in this case.
(R460and515)
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The court's decision is contrary to Utah law. Utah Code §78-45-7.5
(8)(b)(2001) requires that "Social Security benefits received by a child due to the
earnings of a parent shall be credited as child support to the parent upon whose
earning record it is based by crediting the amount against the potential obligation of
that parent." (Emphasis added).
At trial, Steven argued that even if the court imputed income to him and
ordered that he pay child support, that the Social Security Disability payments of
$672 per month made to the children as his dependents should be credited toward
his child support obligation. (R310)
Debra argued that crediting the payments toward current child support was
discretionary and under Utah law, citing Coulon v. Coulon. 915 P.2d 1069, (Ct. App
1996) the payments could not be credited toward arrearage. (R484, T29-30). In
Coulon. the obligor father was permitted to credit his Social Security payments for
the children toward his current child support obligations. However the Court of
Appeals refused to allow the excess beyond his monthly child support obligation of
$300 to be applied toward arrearage. Coulon at 1071.
At trial Steven conceded that the payments could not be credited toward
arrearage under Coulon. (R311). However, the current and future payments
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should be credited pursuant to the statute in Utah Code §78-45-7.5 (8)(b)(2001).2
(R311).
In Coulon. the Court of Appeals cited Brooks v. Brooks. 881 P.2d 955, 961
(Utah App. 1994) (holding courts have discretion to credit social security payments
to obligor's ongoing support.) However, the Utah Court of Appeals in Brooks stated:
"the Court in its discretion should consider the benefits because:
Social security dependent disability benefits replace support the child
loses upon the disability of the wage earner responsible for the child's
support, and such benefits substitute for a parent's loss of earning
power and obligation to support his dependents. Thus the source and
the purpose of social security dependent benefits are identical to the
source and purpose of child support-both come from a non-custodial
parent's wages or assets and both provide for the needs of the
dependent child and, for our purposes "no principled distinction exists
between social security benefits and child support payments.
i d at 962.
Both Coulon and Brooks relied on an earlier version of the statute §78-45-7.5
(8)(b) which was in force at the time of the respective decisions. In 1998 this
statute, including paragraph 8b was specifically amended by the Utah Legislature to
replace the word "may" with "shall," making it mandatory for the court to credit the
Social Security Disability income the children receive toward the disabled worker's
child support. The statute reads as follows:

2

(Steven also argued that the payments could be credited toward other
children's expenses such as interest or the unreimbursed medical and insurance
costs.)
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(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a
parent shall be credited as child support to the parent upon whose
earning record it is based by crediting the amount against the potential
obligation of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be
considered as income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of
the case.
Utah Code Section 78-45-7.5 (Amended by Chapter 116, 2001 Session)
This is a question of statutory construction, reviewed for correctness. Mancil
v. Smith 18 P.3d 509, 511, 2000 UT App. 378, If 22.
The court, in finding that the decision to credit SSDI payments toward the
child support obligation was discretionary ignored the plain language of the statute.
"Ordinarily, the use of the word "shall" in a statute creates a mandatory condition,
eliminating any discretion on the part of the courts. See, e.g., Office of the Guardian
Ad Litem v. Anderson. 1999 UT App 251,U 10, 987 P.2d 611: Keith v. Rizzuto. 212
F.3d 1190, 1193 n. 3 (10th Cir.2000) (" 'It is a basic canon of statutory construction
that the use of the word "shall" indicates a mandatory intent.'" (quoting United
States v. Mvers. 106 F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir.1997)). Diener v. Diener. 98 P.3d
1178, 1182, 2004 UT App 314, f i 2 (Utah App. 2004).
In this particular statute, the use of the word "shall" has particular
significance. The Legislature, demonstrated a clear intent to remove discretion as
to the crediting of the children's payments toward child support when it specifically
substituted the word "shall" for "may" in this subsection. Therefor the court should
have followed the legislative mandate.
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The trial court was aware of the current version of the statute §78-45-7.5 as it
was admitted as Respondent's Exhibit R13 A Pages 13-14 at trial. Furthermore,
prior to Debra's counsel preparing the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Order, Respondent submitted to the court a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment,
pointing out the mandatory language of the statute §78-45-7.5 as compared with the
discretionary language at the time of Brooks and Coulon in 1994 and 1996
respectively. (R465-480). The court failed to address this concern in its
memorandum decision (R460) and Findings of Facts (R515), stating only that
"Giving a credit to a parent for children's SSDI payments received is discretionary
with the Court under certain circumstances such as exist in this case." (R515)
There is no Utah case law addressing this issue since the statute was
amended to make the credit mandatory. The statute was amended in 1998, after
the 1996 Coulon decision, making it controlling, and demonstrating the legislative
intent to eliminate uncertainty and remove discretion regarding applying the funds
toward child support.
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ISSUE
II. THE FINDINGS REGARDING LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF
CIRCUMSTANCES WERE INSUFFICIENT UNDER UTAH CODE ANN §78-45-7.2
INSOFAR AS THEY ADDRESSED THE PARTIES' INCOMES AND PETITIONER'S
INCOME SHOULD HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN THE CHILD SUPPORT
CALCULATIONS AND WORKSHEET.
In the Findings of Fact the court stated: "The court does not find reasonably
unresolved material changes of circumstances existing on a permanent basis which
would justify a modification of child support required by Steven." (R515). Further,
in the Conclusions of Law, the court stated:
This court has reviewed this case very carefully to fully consider the
important potential issue arising from Mr. Meenderink's (Steven) claim
of disability and inability to work. Under all the facts of this case, his
disability, coupled with his claim that this Court should take into
consideration his ex-wife's (Debra Meenderink) present ability to work
and earn do not in this Court's opinion constitute a substantial material
change of circumstances which would justify this Court's elimination or
reduction of his child support obligation.

(R515)
The trial court erred by leaving child support as it had been without making
adequate findings. The trial court failed to include Debra's income in the child
support worksheet and calculations. The court in its decision stated:
All present claims of changed circumstances should have been
resolved and/or reasonably anticipated at the time of the divorce. This
includes the fact that Debra is earning at a higher level than at the time
of the divorce. Through great effort on her part, she too is becoming
more educated and in the future should be able to earn more as would
normally have been anticipated by the parties.
(R514)
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Utah Law requires that both parents' earnings be considered on the child
support worksheet. Utah Code Ann §78-45-7.7. Utah statutes state that each parent
has a duty to support his or her child.: "Every man shall support his child ..." Utah
Code Ann. §78-45-3 (1987); "Every woman shall support her child . . . " Utah Code
Ann. §78-45-4 (1987). Utah courts have recognized that both parents have an
obligation to support their children. Allred v. Allred 797 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990), Woodward v. Woodward. 709 P.2d. 393 394 (Utah 1985) (per curiam).
The court erred in basing child support on an income of "0" for Debra where the
court recognized her gainful employment.
At the time of the divorce, Debra was not working. She remarried within days
after the divorce and may not have anticipated working. (T66). The income on the
originalfindingsof fact and child support worksheet was set at "0" for Debra.
(R188).
In the modification, the court failed to establish Debra's current income,
although it recognized that "Debra is earning at a higher level than at the time of the
divorce" (R514). Instead the trial court found that there was no substantial change
of circumstances and that child support should remain at $884. (R515). Debra's
increased earnings was specifically one of the conditions triggering the Petition.
Debra's income had already been established at $1440 per month through the
Ogden City School District in the Order on Objection Hearing from March 11, 2002.
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(R168) The court gave no explanation or rationale for failing to make a finding as to
Debra's actual earnings, why it did not impute her to a full time wage, or why it did
not adopt the amount determined at the prior hearing.
The evidence of Debra's earnings at the time of trial came through Debra
Meenderink's own testimony: "Right now I am a substitute teacher, a permanent
substitute teacher with Ogden City Schools." (T206 lines 8-10). Debra further
verified that she worked only 3 days per week by choice (T206 lines 22-250), and
her present earnings at that position were "ten [dollars] forty five [cents] per hour."
(T209lines13-15).
Utah Code §78-45-7.5 discusses the requirement of considering each
parent's income into the child support calculations: Subsection 5 states:
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an
annual basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross
monthly income.
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each
parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and
complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year
unless the court finds the verification is not reasonably available.
Verification of income from records maintained by the Department of
Workforce Services may be substituted for pay stubs, employer
statements, and income tax returns.
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists.
The court appeared to disregard the unrefuted evidence that Debra was now
earning income. Debra admitted at trial that she had earned substantial income and
left her position at the Ogden City Schools voluntarily. (T224 lines 2-25 & T225,
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lines 1-8).
At trial Debra did not claim that her circumstances regarding employment had
not changed since the divorce. Debra explained that at the time of the Decree, she
did not work and had twins in separate shifts at kindergarten. (T232 line 2-14). At
the time of trial the twins were in 6th grade. (T232 lines 13-14). Debra conceded
that she could and did work at that time (T232 Iines15-16).
Furthermore at trial, Debra did not argue that she should not be attributed
some income. During cross examination, Debra discussed the issue as follows:
Ms. Labatte: Are you willing to concede that the child support
worksheet ought to be adjusted on both sides of the worksheet with
your income as well as Steve's?
Debra: With my income at what it is right now? Yes.
Ms. Labatte: What amount do you propose that is appropriate?
Debra: I don't know.
(T 240 lines 19-25).
In this case, the court failed to follow the statutory scheme in calculating
appropriate child support according to both parties' current adjusted gross incomes.
The procedure required was explained in Allred v. Allred. 797 P.2d 1108,(Utah Ct.
App. 1990):
First the court must find the amount of total support needed for the
child,... Once the total cost of support is ascertained, the trial court
can determine through a fairly simple mathematical operation each
parent's proportional share of that support with reference to each
parent's share of their combined income. Other things being equal the
amounts determined through the use of this formula will be the amounts
each parent must contribute. However, the court may go on to consider
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other appropriate factors, including those listed in §78-45-7(2) and
adjust these amounts as needed if unusual circumstances exist.
Unusual circumstances prompting some adjustment of the respective
support figures must be adequately supported by detailed findings.
Allred at 1113; See also Diener v. Diener 98 P.3d at 1182.
The actual step by step process has been codified in the Utah Code §78-457.7 (2001) The factors the court may consider include:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the ability of an incapacitated adult child to earn, or other benefits
received by the adult child or on the adult child's behalf including
Supplemental Security Income;
(f) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child;
(g) the ages of the parties; and
(h) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of
others.
The trial court's findings are silent as to the income of each party. As to Steve, the
court similarly did not state specifically what Steven could actually earn. The court
stated "He is fully capable of working and earning a reasonable salary at least
comparable with that he earned prior to the divorce along with periodic normal
increases in earnings" (R513) leaving the inference that he was to be set at his
prior earnings. However the court failed to go through the required process to
determine each party's current income and apply the factors as set out in the Utah
Code 78-45-7.7.
"Findings are adequate only if they are sufficiently detailed and include
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enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate Conclusions on
each factual issue was reached. Allred v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, (Utah Ct. App.
1990, Stevens v. Stevens. 754 P.2D 952, 958 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Acton
V. Deliran. 737 P. 2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). In this matter, the court omitted critical
findings on the incomes of each party.
The court also erred in finding that "All present claims of changed
circumstances should have been resolved and or reasonably anticipated at the time
of the divorce. This includes the fact that Debra is earning at a higher level than at
the time of the divorce." (R514.) The court also stated it was "obviously
anticipated that Debra would have to work to support herself and the children."
(R509)
The Decree is silent as to Debra's likelihood of earning in the future. The
Decree states only "the child support is based upon plaintiffs gross monthly income
of $0.00, and the defendant's gross monthly income of $3,333.00, $1800.00
disability and $1440.00 from the contract with Farm Flex, pursuant to the Uniform
Child Support Schedule and child support worksheets, copies of which are attached
hereto and incorporated by reference." (R191), see also Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, (R177), (with worksheet attached) (R188).
In order for a material change in circumstances to be contemplated in a
divorce decree there must be evidence, preferably in the form of a
provision within the decree itself that the trial court anticipated the
specific change. See Durfee v. Durfee 796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah,
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1990). Accordingly if both the divorce decree and the record are bereft
of any reference to the changed circumstance at issue in the petition to
modify, then the subsequent changed circumstance was not
contemplated in the original divorce decree.
Bolliqerv. Bolliaer 997 P.2d 903, 906 (2000 Utah App. 4 7 , f l 3 )
The court's rationale that it was obviously anticipated that Debra would be
working would be contrary to the statutory scheme of Utah Code Ann §78 -45-7.2
(9) (iii and iv).(permitting modification when a parent's earning increases by 30 % or
more and when a parent has a material change in ability to earn income)
"The change in circumstances required to justify a modification of a divorce
decree varies with the type of modification sought." Haslam v. Haslam. 657 P.2d
757, 758 (Utah 1982). The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "provisions in the
original decree of divorce granting alimony, child support and the like must be
readily susceptible to alteration at a later date, as the needs which such provisions
were designed to fill are subject to rapid and unpredictable change." id. Quoting
Foulqerv.Foulqer626 P.2d 412 (Utah 1981).
Rather than summarily dismissing the Petition, the request for modification
should have first been considered under Utah Code §78 -45-7.2 (8). Section 8(a) &
(b) provide:
(8) (a) If a child support order has not been issued or modified within
the previous three years, a parent, legal guardian, or the office may
petition the court to adjust the amount of a child support order.
b) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (8)(a), the court shall,
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taking into account the best interests of the child, determine whether
there is a difference between the amount ordered and the amount that
would be required under the guidelines. If there is a difference of 10%
or more and the difference is not of a temporary nature, the court shall
adjust the amount to that which is provided for in the guidelines,
(c) A showing of a substantial change in circumstances is not
necessary for an adjustment under Subsection (8)(b).
As stated above, a substantial change of circumstances is not required when
applying this subsection of §78-45-7.2. In this case, child support had not been
modified within the previous three years.
However, the parties' circumstances also fit the criteria under sub-section (9):
(9) (a) A parent, legal guardian, or the office may at any time petition
the court to adjust the amount of a child support order if there has been
a substantial change in circumstances.
(b) For purposes of Subsection (9)(a), a substantial change in
circumstances may include:
(I) material changes in custody;
(ii) material changes in the relative wealth or assets of the parties;
(Hi) material changes of 30% or more in the income of a parent;
(iv) material changes in the ability of a parent to earn;
(v) material changes in the medical needs of the child; and
(vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities of either parent for the
support of others.
(c) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (9)(a), the court shall,
taking into account the best interests of the child, determine whether a
substantial change has occurred. If it has, the court shall then
determine whether the change results in a difference of 15% or more
between the amount of child support ordered and the amount that
would be required under the guidelines. If there is such a difference
and the difference is not of a temporary nature, the court shall adjust
the amount of child support ordered to that which is provided for in the
guidelines
Debra's employment satisfied the provisions of sub-paragraph (9)(b)(iii) and
(iv). The required analysis was not followed, as there are no findings as to the
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parents' incomes, the difference in child support which would result and specific
finding that there was reason to rebut the guidelines.
Pursuant to the Rules of Appellate Procedure, Respondent notes the
following other evidence which may have supported or impacted the findings:
At trial Debra provided testimony that she had a hard time supporting the
children. (T220 lines 11-190.) She was working toward her college degree and had
more than 45 hours credit. (T206). Additionally she had experienced financial
hardship and had born the expense of several significant obligations related to the
marriage. These included unreimbursed medical expenses (Exhibits 1, 8 & 9),
equity lost in the home, (Exhibit R13 page 12), (T208 lines 14-30) and a tax debt
from the 1996 marital tax returns. (T 216-219, Exhibit 10). She attributed fault for
all these obligations to Steven.
Debra further testified that she had relied on her father for assistance with
expenses related to health insurance, children's medical and dental costs and her
own personal needs. (T215 line 11-22). However, none of these financial
hardships negated the fact that Debra was now actually working and able to earn
income.
At trial Debra testified that she was only working 3 days per week, and
attending school. (T206 lines 8-11). Debra never presented any meaningful
evidence why she continually failed to seek full time employment over the 6 years
prior to trial. Regardless of her part time college courses, Debra should have been
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held to be gainfully employed. Mancil at 512. Debra relied on her father's voluntary
assistance, but never explained why she could not consistently work full time.
Despite this, the court found that "As compared with the effort of Debra Meenderink
to support and provide for the children, her efforts have far exceeded his." (R511).
Ordinarily the court is accorded considerable discretion in adjusting the
financial interests of divorced parties and thus the court's actions are
entitled to a presumption of validity. However, where the court has
abused its discretion in apportioning those financial responsibilities, we
cannot affirm that determination. One such case we have recognized
in this area of the law is failure to enter specific, detailed findings
supporting each of the factors which must be considered when making
a child support award."
Allredv.Allred.at1111.
Despite Debra's claims of hardship, the court should have followed the
statutory requirements regarding child support assessment including both parents in
the formula.
ISSUE
III. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE ACTUAL JUDGMENT FOR
CHILD SUPPORT AND THE ARREARAGE WAS CALCULATED INCORRECTLY.
Respondent appeals the actual judgment of $17,377.34 for child support,
because even if the court's decision is upheld the actual judgment does not reflect
the amount which would be owed under the Order. The trial court's findings were
inadequate to determine how much child support was actually owed.
In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellant must marshal the
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence,
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the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of
the evidence. Main Street v. Easy Heat. Inc.. 2004 UT 72 fl 69.
At trial, Debra presented some evidence regarding her claims to arrearage:
(Exhibits 2-7). At trial, Debra claimed a total arrearage of $13,825.45 including
interest through April 30, 2004. (Exhibit 2). Steve produced voluminous evidence
demonstrating his cash or check payments from January 1999 through April 2004.
(Exhibit R13 B pages 7-32). Debra did not dispute Steven's claims to have made
any payments backed up by receipts.3
Debra presented Exhibit 6 purporting Steven to be in arrears of $568.19 in
May 1999, while Steven presented the parties' written agreement showing that all
child support was paid as of May 15,1999. (Exhibit R13 B page 6).
In closing arguments the parties presented the following calculations of
arrearage:
Debra then claimed $15,420.78 child support owed from January 1999
through April 30, 2004 including interest (an increase of $1593.33 from her trial
exhibit)4
Steven calculated $3481.00 child support owed if all SSDI payments were
3

(Debra denied receiving cash payments from Steven although she had
previously credited him with payments of an additional $3905 in her Affidavit for
Order to Show Cause. Because the court accepted Debra's testimony that she
miscalculated, Steven does not pursue those amounts in his appeal.)
"Debra's closing argument is missing from the record provided by the trial
court. However, Steven's response to it is found at R406-417.
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timely credited toward current support and cash payments were applied toward
current and past due support. Respondent's Closing Argument, Exhibit C. (R347).
In its memorandum decision the court made the following ruling regarding
child support obligations and arrearage: "All unpaid child support amounts prior to
October 1, 2001, and if the $20.00 per month has not been paid, they are owing and
may be reduced to a judgment." Memorandum (R460). This was also stated in the
Findings of Facts. (R515).
However, this decision fails to delineate how much child support was actually
owed and unpaid. It did not clarify the court's ruling on several issues including:
1. Whether the court found Steven to be fully paid in May 15,1999;
2. How the SSDI payments were credited, including excess payments and
how actual cash payments in addition to the SSDI were to be accounted for and
credited. See Respondent's final closing argument (R407). Cash payments in
addition to the SSDI should have been applied toward arrearage.
3. Whether the judgment was to enter as of August 31, 2004; or
4. Whether the subsequent months which passed between the memorandum
order and the filing of the formal Order and Judgment were to be included in the
final judgment.
The trial court in Its Memorandum ruling next ordered:
From September 1, 2004, the child support payable will return to the
amount of $884.00 per month. Steven may deduct up to three months
future payments from his child support obligation for money paid to the
-37-

children by SSDI...
Memorandum (R460), Findinqs of Fact (R515).
Additionally, the court ruled: "because there were some additional periods
SSDI paid for the children before this court started crediting him, no interest on
delinquent child support prior to October 2001 shall be awarded to Debra." (R51516).
The findings of fact merely stated: "Based on the evidence the Court
determines that there is an arrearage in child support due to the Debra in the
amount of $17,377.74." (R516).

This finding is inadequate to tell which part of the

evidence the court relied on. Without adequate explanation, the final order entered
a sum of child support owed totaling $17,377.74. The final order inexplicably
assessed $252.81 as delinquent support for the year 2003, and $3,492.14 as
support owed for the year 2004, (R506,507) even though the SSDI payments were
to be credited as child support though those entire years. (R515). It is unclear how
Steven's cash payments were credited as well. Therefor Steven is left without a
method to determine how this amount was reached.
It is impossible to tell where Debra came up with her figures for the final
arrearage of $17,377.74. It is possible that she did not include the correct months
which were in dispute, failed to credit the final three months offset for SSDI
payments or that she included interest during the period prior to October 2001,
contrary to the court's ruling. (R515-16). The Findings of Fact merely stated,
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"based on the evidence the court determines that there is an arrearage due to the
Debra in the amount of $17,377.74." (R516). The court made no findings as to how
it reached the actual amount owed, leaving the accounting to the attorneys.
A trial court's findings are adequate only if they are "sufficiently detailed and
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Mancil v. Smith. 18 P. 3d 509, 511,
2000 UT App. 378. Findings of fact will be regarded as clearly erroneous only if
they are "so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence."
Haoan v. Hagan. 810 P.2d 478,158 Utah Adv. Rep 66 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
In reviewing an award of child support, "we accord substantial deference to
the trial court's findings and give it considerable latitude in fashioning the
appropriate relief." Watson v. Watson. 837 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting
Woodward v. Woodward. 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985). "We do not disturb the
trial court's actions unless the evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary or
there has been an abuse of discretion." ]d. (Quoting Woodward. 709 P.2d at 394).
The court entered the final judgment without warning, as both parties had
requested a hearing. (R471.484). Both parties expected oral argument. Based
on the incomplete findings and the judgment which does not reflect either parties'
calculations at trial, this court should remand the matter for a more detailed analysis
of the amount of child support owed and the periods covered in the judgment. This
figure would of course be impacted by thefinaloutcome of the previous issues.
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ISSUE
IV. WERE ATTORNEY FEES CORRECTLY AWARDED AND SHOULD
ATTORNEY FEES BE AWARDED IF APPELLANT IS SUCCESSFUL ON
APPEAL?
Steven appeals the trial court's decision awarding all attorney fees to Debra.
In order to award attorney fees, the trial court must find (1) the requesting party is in
need of financial assistance; (2) the requested fees are reasonable; and (3) the
other spouse has the ability to pay. Bolliqerv. Bolliger at 909. The trial court
awarded attorney fees to Debra making a finding that "based on the trial evidence
that the fees incurred by Debra are reasonable and Debra has a definite need and
is unable to pay the attorney fees without assistance, and that Respondent has an
ability to earn a substantial income and pay the Petitioner's fees which she has
incurred in defending his unsuccessful attempt to permanently lower his child
support obligation." (R518).
The analysis was cursory without stating what income either Debra or Steven
were receiving or what their monthly needs entailed. The court further found that
Steven "filed for modification and has caused most of the attorneys fees and
expenses herein." (R517). The trial court's decision seems particularly harsh
where it had previously ruled that during most of the pendency, Steven was
legitimately permitted to apply the SSDI benefits to his child support obligations.
Admittedly, "both the decision to award attorney fees and the amount of such fees
are within the trial court's discretion." Wilde v. Wilde. 969 P.2d 438, 444 (Utah Ct.
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App. 1998).
However, if this Court finds that the trial court abused its discretion or that it
misapplied the law; it may reverse that decision, or if Steven is the prevailing party
on appeal, this court may award him attorney fees on appeal, subject to the analysis
required. Bolliaer at 909.
CONCLUSION
After full consideration of the above facts and arguments, this Court should
make the following orders:
This Court should reverse the trial court's decision regarding the prospective
SSDI dependent benefits and order that all Social Security Disability payments
made to the children should be applied toward child support obligations as they
accrued.
The Court should further rule that the discretionary directives of Coulon and
Brooks have been superceded by legislative changes.
This Court should remand the issue of modification of child support to the trial
court requiring detailed findings as to each party's income and the facts considered
in reaching those findings. Then the incomes should be applied to the calculations
of child support and the obligation of each parent. The trial court should then make
a determination whether modification of support is appropriate.
This Court should remand the matter regarding the judgment for child support
and require the trial court to prepare findings that adequately demonstrate what
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amount of child support was owed, what amount was paid in cash or check, how the
SSDI payments were credited toward the child support obligation and what periods
included interest added. If this Court determines that the children's SSDI payments
must be credited toward Steven's child support at all times, the trial court should
also factor that into the findings.
On the issue of attorney fees, this Court should consider whether the findings
regarding attorney fees were adequate particularly in light of the incomplete findings
on the parties' incomes. If so, the determination should be reversed. Additionally,
this Court should award attorney fees to Steven is he is successful on his appeal.
Respectfully submitted this /1

day of October 2005,

CATHERINE F. LABATTE, #6763
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT

-42-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served the brief of appellant, herein upon the opposing party
by placing two true and correct copies thereof in an envelope and causing the same
to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid on the _//_ of October, 2005 to the
following:

Joseph M. Chambers
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee, Debra Meenderink
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321

CATHERINE F. LABATTE
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT/RESPONDENT
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ADDENDUM

ORDER ON OBJECTION TO COMMISSIONER'S RULING ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
MEMORANDUM DECISION
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION TO MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE AND JUDGMENT
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DEBRA MEENDERINK,
Petitioner,

ORDER ON OBJECTION TO
COMMISSIONER'S RULING ON
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

vs.
Case No. 974901209
STEVEN MEENDERINK,
Judge: Roger S. Dutson
Respondent

v^oinniioMOiicr. JLMV IU-O. L/HIUII

Petitioner's Objection to Commissioner's Ruling on Order to Show Cause came on for
hearing on March 11, 2002, before the Honorable Roger S. Dutson. Petitioner was present and
represented by counsel, Joseph M. Chambers. Respondent was present and represented by
counsel Catherine F. Labatte. The court heard proffers of the parties, took evidence on the issue
of imputation of income to Respondent and Respondent's current ability to work, and after
hearing testimony, and reviewing the exhibits and proffers of the parties, the Court hereby makes
and enters the following Order:

1.

Petitioner has returned to Weber County, and it is no longer necessary to modify

the visitation or custody order.
2.

As to Respondent's request for a modification in the child support, the Court

makes the following findings and orders:
a.

The Petitioner is currently employed with the Weber County School

District making an hourly rate of $11.00 per hour, totaling $440.00 per week for nine months of
the year. This results in a gross monthly salary of $1,440.00 per month, when computed
annually. The Respondent is currently receiving Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI")
based on an injury subsequent to the Divorce Decree and his current gross monthly income is
$1,333.00. However, according to the statute, the Social Security Disability Insurance income is
exempted from gross monthly income for the child support calculations and worksheet.
b.

Petitioner is additionally receiving $642.00 in Social Security Disability

Insurance dependent's payments through Respondent's account. Both parties shall be subject to
income verification and shall provide proof of income to opposing counsel through their
attorneys.
c.

The Court finds that after taking evidence and testimony, that Respondent

has suffered a disabling injury, creating a substantial and material change of circumstances and it
is reasonable that Respondent is unemployed, pursuing a college degree which would be required
in his past field of employment. The Court denies Petitioner's request to impute income at this
time. This may not be a permanently disabling condition.
Order on Objection to Commissioner's Ruling
Meenderink v. Meenderink
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d.

Effective August 1, 2001, Respondent's obligation for child support shall

be set according to the Standard Guidelines using Petitioner's income of $1,440.00 per month
and Respondent's income of $0 per month, resulting in an obligation of $20.00 per month.
Pursuant to Utah Code 78-45-7, the Social Security Payments made subject to Respondent's
earnings shall be credited against his child support obligations. Effectively, Petitioner is
receiving a greater amount than the support obligation and no out of pocket payment is required
from Respondent at this time.
3.

Respondent is ordered to provide an accounting of funds disbursed to him for the

benefit of the children, and should contact the Social Security Administration for verification of
amounts paid to him prior to the Petitioner's transferring the payments to her address.
DATED this

day of

r^

"

. .V:

2002.

ROGERSrbUTSON
Second District Court Judge
Approved as to Form & Content:

JOSEPH M CHAMBERS
Attorney for Petitioner

Order on Objection to Commissioner's Ruling
Meenderink v. Meenderink
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Pursuant to Rule 4-504(2), UCJA, and subject to the time computations of Rule
6(a)(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, you are hereby notified that the undersigned
will hold the original hereof for a period of 11 days from the date this notice is mailed to
you to allow you sufficient time to file any written objections to the foregoing with the
Court and mail a copy to the undersigned. If no objections are filed within that time, the
original hereof will be submitted to the Court for signature and filing.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order on Order to
Show Cause on this ^% day of March, 2002 to:
Joseph M. Chambers
Attorney at Law
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, UT 84321
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Meenderink v Meenderink
Page 4

Tab 2

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT

DEBRA MEENDERINK,
Petitioner,
vs.
STEVEN MEENDERINK,
Respondent.

j
j
j
|
j
j

MEMORANDUM
Case No. 974901209 DA
Honorable Roger S. Dutson

!

This Court has reviewed this case very carefully to fully consider the important potential issue
arising from Mr. Meenderink's (Steven) claim of disability and inability to work. He does have a
disability and the issue is whether or not, under all the facts-of this case, his disability, coupled with
his claim that this Court should take into consideration his ex-wife's (Debra) present ability to work
and earn, constitute a substantial material change of circumstances which would justify this Court's
elimination or reduction of his original child support obligation. Other issues raised in the case also
require a decision by the Court.
The Court concludes that there have been some changes in circumstances affecting Mr.
Meenderink's health. However, the Court has granted him more than adequate opportunity to obtain
further college or rehabilitative education to mitigate his somewhat worsened health condition. The
purpose of temporarily suspending his child support obligation and allowing a lesser amount of child
support to the approximate amount of child benefit paid by SSDI was to permit additional education
and rehabilitation so he could obtain substantial comparable employment to that which existed at the
time of the divorce. After considering all the facts, the Court does not find, on balance, a substantial
material change of circumstances that were reasonably unforeseeable or unpredictable at the time of
divorce. The original child support obligation should not be disturbed.
The basic facts are that Debra and Steven Meenderink were divorced in early 1998. They
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have three children. Steven was working and Debra had not been working regularly Child support
was determined, pursuant to the regular child support tables, to be payable in the amount of S884.00
per month. It was obviously anticipated that Debra would have to work to support herself and the
children.
Prior to the divorce, in April 1995, Steven had been seriously injured in an accident, breaking
several bones andfracturinghis pelvis. He recovered substantially, though still having some problems
with his hip and some pain. At the time of the divorce about three years later, he had been making
good money, partly from contract work in the pharmaceutical business. After the divorce in 1998
Steven was involved in another accident which aggravated his earlier injuries somewhat and partially
because of developing osteoarthritis, it later became necessary for Steven to have his hip replaced.
He now claims that because of his injuries, physical ailments and pain, he cannot work. The Social
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program has placed him on disability, making monthly payments
to him and the children.
Steven receives about $1,445.00 per month from SSDI. Debra, receives payments directly
from SSDI for the children in the amount of about $642.00 per month, which is $242.00 per month
less than the original child support order, which had been based on historical earnings.
In July 2001 Steven filed for Modification of the Decree based on his claimed disability and
to obtain custody of the oldest child, a daughter about 13 years of age. He claimed the child did not
want to move from the Weber County area and would be better off with him because Debra had
remarried and moved to St. George, Utah, about five hours away. [Of some note, this marriage was
short-lived but resulted in relieving Steven of his long-term alimony obligation of $600.00 per month.]
In October 2001, the court Commissioner found Debra had moved back to this area and the change
of custody issue became moot. The Domestic Commissioner recommended that temporarily Steven
pay only $20.00 per month additional child support above the SSDI money the children were
receiving effective August 1, 2001.
This Court finds that Steven has not been motivated to obtain employment for more reasons
than because he has some physical pain and discomfort. He has been able to travel extensively
(including a trip to Russia), become somewhat of a 'Disneyland Dad' to try and look good to the
children, and continues with a relatively normal active physical and social life. He has done many
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things to avoid his capability and responsibility as afinanciallycontributing father for the benefit of
his children. It is the Court's opinion he has intentionally delayed and dragged this litigation on for
many months. He has asked for and received substantial time beyond what was needed for
completing his educational studies to better qualify him for good employment. Hefinishedhis initial
court approved schooling, which he represented to the Court was needed so he could get a good job
as a pharmaceutical representative. It appears he declined or did not actively pursue a possible job
as a pharmaceutical representative because he would have been required to move to another nearby
state He has asked and received from the Court more time for schooling so he could become a
teacher. He got more time. He has engaged in other delay tactics, such as being unresponsive to
discovery, motions, etc., claiming that as a pro se litigant he didn't fully understand the procedures,
though he used the procedures himself to delay The Court believes that when he got his SSDI award
he stopped putting forth adequate further effort to meet his full responsibilities to his children under
the divorce order in anticipation the Court would not make him work so long as the kids got the
SSDI benefit.
As compared with the effort of Debra to support and provide for the children, her efforts have
far exceeded his. He has completed the initial requested college program and then asked for more
time in school, apparently bouncing around in various college disciplines without any real objective
to gain good employment. Of great surprise to this Court, he now requests this Court to count as
separate income to Debra in calculating child support, substantial sums of money paid to her by her
father, Mr. Dan Favero, who felt it necessary to pay to provide bare necessities for the benefit of the
children. With the income received from SSDI, her own employment and even her father's assistance,
Debra has only been able to obtain the bare necessities of life and reasonable medical treatment for
the children. This request to add money paid for the children by Debra's father is consistent with
Steven's effort to avoid work and put forth any personal effort himself to provide proper financial
support for the three children. The oldest child, now in her teens, and the twin boys, now 12 years
old, are at an expensive time of their lives. He argues that if he goes to work 'they' will lose that
SSDI benefit. He wants the Court to determine child support obligation should be only that which
is paid by SSDI and let him totally off the hook to look for and obtain good employment, even though
more education to get good employment has been his argument since October 2001, to justify
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continuing his college education. Initially, even that request was only to be for a few months so he
could get a 'degree' and become a pharmaceutical representative. Also of interest to the Court, is
Steven's request that this Court apply some of the children's SSDI money to reduce his child support
arrearage incurred before the SSDI money for the children kicked in, which is contrary to reason in
this case and contrary to some case law on the subject.
Of substantial importance is the fact that those who administer SSDI benefits allow persons
to continue receiving SSDI payments even though they are capable of working. SSDI administrators',
in this case, do not require Steven, a person capable of working, to go to work under the concept that
persons need not work if they are unable to do ". . . the work they did before. . .." and SSDI decides
they ". . . cannot adjust to other work because of their medical condition(s)." At trial, a Vocational
Rehabilitation specialist working with SSDI testified that they will not terminate Steven's payment
because they agree with him that he falls within the foregoing provision. Further, the specialist
testifies that they will not "pressure" anyone to work in any area they are not happy and satisfied in,
if it is different from previous work experience, (apparently in this case, only pharmaceuticals.) They
apparently will not require him to move to another nearby state to obtain work.
The evidence is clear that Steven would likely continue on SSDI indefinitely because he does
not want to find a pharmaceutical or similar job because he would not be "happy with it" and it would
not be convenient for him. However, he acknowledged that a pharmaceutical job opening he qualified
for became available but would have required him to move to another western state and he didn't
want to move. He didn't pursue that job, apparently not finding it "convenient" for him to move to
a nearby state. He attempts to bolster his arguments on the fact SSDI concurs with his continuing
claim of an "inability" to find "convenient" work that would make him "happy". During all this time
he has not been working, he has traveled extensively, including a trip to Russia, he has attended
school successfully and he has engaged in various physical activities which apparently are
"convenient" to him.
Steven's claimed need for additional training and college for various purposes has been
granted without resulting in a job. It now appears Steven is not willing to work unless absolutely
required to do so by the Court. The Court recognizes Steven is somewhat disabled as is supported
by medical evidence and in part by his eligibility for SSDI payments. However, he is fully capable
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of working and earning a reasonable salary at least comparable with that he earned prior to the
divorce along with periodic normal increases in earnings.

CHILD SUPPORT:
The Court has heard a great deal of evidence regarding Steven's disability. The Court is not
bound by Social Security standards that Steven should not work at a job that he isn't totally "happy"
with or the fact that he might have to move to a nearby State. Steven has not shown he is physically
unable to engage in many available types of work, even though perhaps he might have to change his
fields of work or possibly move to another location. He has been given several years to obtain his
requested college degrees and retraining for his own expressed types of work, and he must now face
his financial responsibilities and get a job.
The Court accepted his original argument that he did have some periods of time after his
second accident where he was not fully capable of working, needed physical and educational
rehabilitation, and therefore, was not in a good position to pay child support. The Court waived
normal child support for a lengthy period of time to allow him to rehabilitate, requiring only $20.00
per month payments.
Overall, though numerous events have occurred since the divorce, on balance, Steven's
disability problems have either been resolved or could have reasonably been resolved and he could
have obtained substantial employment income. He was injured initially before the divorce. Because
of the fact he has been rehabilitated sufficiently to work and earn at least at the level existing at the
time of the divorce, all present claims of changed circumstances should have been resolved and/or
reasonably anticipated at the time of the divorce. This includes the fact that Debra is earning at a
higher level than at the time of divorce. Through great effort on her part, she too is becoming more
educated and in the future should be able to earn more as would normally have been anticipated by
the parties. However, Steven should have been working and at least maintaining a comparable level
of increased income long before now.
Therefore, the Court does not find reasonably unresolved material changes of circumstances
existing on a permanent basis which would justify a modification of child support required from
Steven. However, from October 2001 to August 1, 2Q04, his normally incurred child support
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obligation will still be substantially waived, except for the $20 00 per month, and the amounts paid
by SSDI for the benefit of the children. The Court grants him that benefit even though the Court finds
he should have been working long ago. All unpaid child support amounts prior to October 1, 2001,
and if the $20 00 per month has not been paid, they are owing and may be reduced to a judgment.
From September 1, 2004, the child support amount payable will return to the amount of $884.00 per
month. Steven may deduct up to three-months future payments from his child support obligation for
money paid to the children by SSDI. However, Steven must obtain employment within three months
from the date of this memorandum or Debra may retain any amounts paid by SSDI for the benefit of
the children in addition to the $884.00 child support obligation payable by Steven. If he continues
to receive SSDI and the children are still eligible for SSDI benefits, he shall do nothing to reduce or
terminate those benefits. Granting a credit to a parent for children's SSDI payments received is
discretionary with the Court under certain circumstances such as exist in this case.
In Summary and on balance, the Court does not find an unpredictable or unforeseeable
material change of circumstances that would at the present time justify modifying the child support
initially established. Any material changes of circumstances which would affect child support have
or should have been fully addressed and resolved by Steven by rehabilitative training, regular healing
and reasonable effort on his part. However, to assist him with reasonable rehabilitative needs, the
Court has granted a waiver of most of his child support obligation which exceeded the children's
SSDI payments from October 2001 through August 2004 Because there were some additional
periods SSDI paid for the children before this Court started crediting him, no interest on delinquent
child support prior to October 2001 shall be awarded to Debra. The Court also accepts Debra's
explanation that she had mistakenly calculated earlier claims of child support owing which she filed
with the Court, but finds she did so unintentionally.

HOME EQUITY:
The Court finds that the parties reached a superceding and overriding agreement regarding
the home equity and Steven owes her any unpaid amounts pursuant to that agreement establishing
her equity of $14,500.00 dated August 20, 2002. Many circumstances changed regarding the home,
including occupancy by Steven and the Court find that agreement was reasonable. Steven agreed to
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take over the payments on the home and be responsible for the home. If the $4,350.00 identified as
'back child support5 paid at that time exceeds child support owing at that time under this order, it
shall be credited toward Steven's other financial obligation to Debra, applying monies paid first to
the oldest obligations. Otherwise, the terms of that agreement should continue to be in effect and
enforceable. The Court does not know what the impact of the bankruptcies are on this issue and
could further address the matter if there are negative bankruptcy impacts on either party. This should,
at least initially, be done by telephone conference with the Court.

TAXES & IRS OBLIGATIONS:
The parties should be held equally responsible for the amount of taxes calculated to be owing
which arose while the parties were married. Credits must be given for the amounts withheld or
deducted from Debra's subsequent tax returns She should not be required to pay any penalties or
interest chargeable on Steven's portion of the obligation. There should be no obligation to Debra for
interest or penalties that have arisen from Steven's failure to include 1099 income in the tax returns
iffiledafter the parties separated although she would be obligated for the normal taxable amount had
the 1099 income been properly included and filed timely. Steven must hold and save Debra harmless
from any future tax deductions against her except for basic tax amounts she might otherwise owe
under this ruling so long as she has fully paid what is owed by her on a timely basis.

MEDICAL EXPENSES:
Although Debra's claims for medical expenses have been submitted later than provided in the
decree, tardiness is not always equal to forgiveness. The obligations for Steven to pay his portion
of those legitimate medical expenses still exist in this case, notwithstanding whether Debra or her
father paid them for the children's benefit. However, because of her tardiness he does not have to
pay interest to Debra or her father on those amounts.
Both parties have failed, in at least some regard, to fully comply with timely actions in certain
aspect of this case, but both should be cautioned that in the future, the Court will expect more diligent
compliance.
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ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS:
As the Court has alluded to above, Steven should have been more compelled and diligent in
pursuing good employment. He filed for modification and has caused most of the attorney's fees and
expenses incurred herein This Court had issued several beneficial rulings on his behalf and he abused
this leniency by failing to do his part to resolve the issues presented and decided by this Court. He
must get moving toward substantial employment immediately He will be able to pay reasonable
attorney's fees. Debra is still working to obtain greater financial independence with better
employment and is presently unable to anticipate substantially greater income to meet costs and
attorney's fees incurred herein. Steven should be ordered to pay Debra's reasonable attorney's fees
and costs
Debra's attorney shall prepare Findings, Conclusions and an Order consistent herewith.

ROGER $/DUTSON '
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum by
first-class mail, postage prepaid to the following parties this ^j^f" day of August 2004:
JOSEPH CHAMBERS
Attorney for Petitioner
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321
CATHERINE F. LABATTE
Attorney for Respondent
P.O. Box 159
Centerville, Utah 84014
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DEPUTY COURT CLERK
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Background Information
1.

\

Debra Meenderink (Petitioner) and Steven Meenderink (Respondent) were

CO

[divorced in early 1998. They have three children. At the time of the divorce Steven Meenderink

\

kvas working and Debra Meenderink had not been working regularly. Child support was
determined, pursuant to the regular child support tables, to be payable in the amount of $884.00
per month. It was obviously anticipated that Debra Meenderink would have to work to contribute
[to the support of herself and the children.
2.

Prior to the divorce, in April 1995, Steven Meenderink had been seriously injured

in an accident, breaking several bones and fracturing his pelvis. He recovered substantially,
though still having some problems with his hip and some pain.
3.

At the time of the divorce (about three years later), he had been making good

money, partly from contract work in the pharmaceutical business.
4.

After the divorce in 1998 Steven Meenderink was involved in another accident

which aggravated his earlier injuries somewhat, and partially because of developing
osteoarthritis, it later became necessary for Steven Meenderink to have his hip replaced.
5.

Respondent now claims that because of his injuries, physical ailments and pain, he

cannot work. The Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program has placed him on
disability, making monthly payments to him and the children.
6.

Steven Meenderink receives about $1,445.00 per month from SSDI. Debra

Meenderink, receives payments directly from SSDI for the children in the amount of about
Harris, Preston
& Chambers, px.
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321
(435)752-3551

$642.00 per month, which is $242.00 per month less than the original child support order, which
had been based on historical earnings.
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Respondent.
This matter came before the Court for trial upon the Respondent Steven Meenderink:s
Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce based on allegations that there has been a substantial
change of circumstance that would justify this Court's elimination or reduction of his original child
support obligation. The Petitioner, Debra Meenderink, appeared and was represented by her
attorney Joseph M. Chambers, Logan, Utah. The Respondent was present and represented by his
attorney Catherine F. Labatte, Centerville, Utah. Trial occurred over a period of one day on April
21, 2004. After receiving the evidence and subsequent memoranda from the parties' attorneys and
the Court having folly considered the matter and entered its Memorandum Decision dated August
31, 2004, the Court now hereby enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
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7.

In July 2001 Steven Meenderink filed for Modification of the Decree based on his

jclaimed disability and to obtain custody of the oldest child, a daughter about 13 years of age.
Respondent claimed the child did not want to move from the Weber County area and would be
[better off with him because Debra Meenderink had remarried and moved to St. George, Utah,
about five hours away. (Of some note, this marriage was short-lived but resulted in relieving
Steven Meenderink of his long-term alimony obligation of $600.00 per month.)
8.

In October 2001, pursuant to an Order to Show Cause issued in connections with

the Respondent's Petition, the court Commissioner found Debra Meenderink had moved back to
this area and the change of custody issue became moot. The Domestic Commissioner
recommended that temporarily Steven Meenderink pay only $20.00 per month additional child
support above the SSDI money the children were receiving effective August 1, 2001.
9.

This Court finds that Steven Meenderink has not been motivated to obtain

employment for more reasons than because he has some physical pain and discomfort.
Respondent has been able to travel extensively (including a trip to Russia), become somewhat of
a "Disneyland Dad" to try and look good to the children, and continues with a relatively normal
active physical and social life.
10.

Respondent has done many things to avoid his capability and responsibility as a

financially contributing father for the benefit of his children. It is the Court's opinion he has
intentionally delayed and dragged this litigation on for many months. Respondent has asked for
and received substantial time beyond what was needed for completing his educational studies to
better qualify him for good employment.
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11.

Respondent finished his initial court approved schooling, which he represented to

the Court was needed so he could get a good job as a pharmaceutical representative. It appears he
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as

declined or did not actively pursue a possible job as a pharmaceutical representative because he
[would have been required to move to another nearby state.
§

12.

Respondent has asked and received from the Court more time for schooling so he

CO

s

Icould become a teacher. Respondent got more time. Respondent has engaged in other delay
tactics, such as being unresponsive to discovery, motions, etc., claiming that as a pro se litigant
he didn't fully understand the procedures, though he used the procedures himself to delay.
13.

The Court believes that when he got his SSDI award he stopped putting forth

adequate ftirther effort to meet his full responsibilities to his children under the divorce order in
anticipation the Court would not make him work so long as the kids got the SSDI benefit.
14.

As compared with the effort of Debra Meenderink to support and provide for the

children, her efforts have far exceeded his. Respondent has completed the initial requested
college program and then asked for more time in school, apparently bouncing around in various
college disciplines without any real objective to gain good employment.
15.

Of great surprise to this Court, Respondent now requests this Court to count as

separate income to Debra Meenderink in calculating child support, substantial sums of money
paid to her by her father, Mr. Dan Favero, who felt it necessary to pay to provide bare necessities
for the benefit of the children.
16.

With the income received from SSDI, her own employment and even her father's

assistance, Debra Meenderink has only been able to obtain the bare necessities of life and
reasonable medical treatment for the children.
17.
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This request to add money paid for the children by Debra Meenderink's father is

consistent with Steven Meenderink's effort to avoid work and put forth any personal effort
himself to provide proper financial support for the three children.
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18.

The oldest child, now in her teens, and the twin boys, now 12 years old, are at an

|expensive time of their lives.
19.

Respondent argues that if he goes to work "they" will lose that SSDI benefit.

'Respondent wants the Court to determine child support obligation should be only that which is
paid by SSDI and let him totally off the hook to look for and obtain good employment, even
though more education to get good employment has been his argument since October 2001, to
ljustify continuing his college education. Initially, even that request was only to be for a few
months so he could get a "degree" and become a pharmaceutical representative. Also of interest
to the Court, is Steven Meenderink's request that this Court apply some of the children's SSDI
money to reduce his child support arrearage incurred before the SSDI money for the children
kicked in, which is contrary to reason in this case and contrary to some case law on the subject.
20.

Of substantial importance is the fact that those who administer SSDI benefits

allow persons to continue receiving SSDI payments even though they are capable of working.
SSDI administrators', in this case, do not require Steven Meenderink (a person the Court finds is
capable of working) to go to work under the concept that persons need not work if they are
unable to do

the work they did before... and SSDI decides they. . . cannot adjust to other

work because of their medical condition(s)."
21.

At trial, a Vocational Rehabilitation specialist working with SSDI testified that

they will not terminate Steven Meenderink's payment because they agree with him that he falls
within the foregoing provision. Further, the specialist testifies that they will not "pressure"
anyone to work in any area they are not happy and satisfied in, if it is different from previous
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work experience, (apparently in this case, only pharmaceuticals.) They apparently will not require
him to move to another nearby state to obtain work.
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22.

The evidence is clear that Steven Meenderink would likely continue on SSDI

I

*

indefinitely because he does not want to find a pharmaceutical or similar job because he wrould
CO

s

not be "happy with it" and it would not be convenient for him. However, he acknowledged that a
pharmaceutical job opening he qualified for became available but would have required him to
move to another western state and he didn't want to move. Respondent didn't pursue that job,
apparently not finding it "convenient" for him to move to a nearby state. Respondent attempts to
[bolster his arguments on the fact SSDI concurs with his continuing claim of an "inability" to find
convenient" work that would make him "happy",
23.

During all this time he has not been working, he has traveled extensively,

including a trip to Russia, he has attended school successfully and he has engaged in various
physical activities (attending the gym regularly, dancing, water skiing) which apparently are
convenient" to him.
24.

Steven Meenderirik's claimed need for additional training and college for various

purposes has been granted without resulting in a job. It now appears Steven Meenderink is not
willing to work unless absolutely required to do so by the Court.
25.

The Court recognizes Steven Meenderink is somewhat disabled as is supported by

medical evidence and in part by his eligibility for SSDI payments. However, he is fully capable
of working and earning a reasonable salary at least comparable with that he earned prior to the
divorce along with periodic normal increases in earnings.
CHILD SUPPORT:
26.
Harris, Preston
& Chambers, P.c.
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utan 84321
(435) 752-3551

The Court has heard a great deal of evidence regarding Steven Meenderink^

disability. The Court is not bound by Social Security standards that Steven Meenderink should
not work at a job that he isn't totally "happy" with or the fact that he might have to move to a
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nearby State. Steven Meenderink has not shown he is physically unable to engage in many
available types of work, even though perhaps he might have to change his fields of work or
possibly move to another location. Respondent has been given several years to obtain his
requested college degrees and retraining for his own expressed types of work, and he must now
[face his financial responsibilities and get a job.
27.

The Court accepted his original argument that he did have some periods of time

[after his second accident where he was not fully capable of working, needed physical and
(educational rehabilitation, and therefore, was not in a good position to pay child support. The
Court waived normal child support for a lengthy period of time to allow him to rehabilitate,
requiring only $20.00 per month payments.
28.

The Court finds that overall, though numerous events have occurred since the

divorce, on balance, Steven Meenderink's disability problems have either been resolved or could
have reasonably been resolved and he could have obtained substantial employment income.
Respondent was injured initially before the divorce. Because of the fact he has been rehabilitated
sufficiently to work and earn at least at the level existing at the time of the divorce, all present
claims of changed circumstances should have been resolved and/or reasonably anticipated at the
time of the divorce. This includes the fact that Debra Meenderink is earning at a higher level than
at the time of divorce. Through great effort on her part, she too is becoming more educated and in
the future should be able to earn more as would normally have been anticipated by the parties.
29.

However, the Court finds that Steven Meenderink should have been working and

at least maintaining a comparable level of increased income long before now.
3, Preston
mDers, P.c.
lera! Avenue
i, Utah 84331
752-3551

30.

Therefore, the Court does not find reasonably unresolved material changes of

circumstances existing on a permanent basis which would justify a modification of child support
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required from Steven Meenderink. However, from October 2001 to August 1, 2004, his normally
incurred child support obligation will still be substantially waived, except for the $20.00 per
jmonth, and the amounts paid by SSDI for the benefit of the children.
31.

The Court grants him that benefit even though the Court finds he should have been

(working long ago. All unpaid child support amounts prior to October 1, 2001, and if the $20.00
|per month has not been paid, they are owing and may be reduced to a judgment.
32.

From September 1, 2004, the child support amount payable will return to the

amount of $884.00 per month. Steven Meenderink may deduct up to three-months future
payments from his child support obligation for money paid to the children by SSDI. However,
Steven Meenderink must obtain employment within three months from the date of this
memorandum or Debra Meenderink may retain any amounts paid by SSDI for the benefit of the
children in addition to the $884.00 child support obligation payable by Steven Meenderink. If he
continues to receive SSDI and the children are still eligible for SSDI benefits, he shall do nothing
to reduce or terminate those benefits. Granting a credit to a parent for children's SSDI payments
received is discretionary with the Court under certain circumstances such as exist in this case.
33.

In Summary and on balance, the Court does not find an unpredictable or

unforeseeable material change of circumstances that would at the present time justify modifying
the child support initially established. Any material changes of circumstances which would affect
child support have or should have been fully addressed and resolved by Steven Meenderink by
rehabilitative training, regular healing and reasonable effort on his part. However, to assist him
with reasonable rehabilitative needs, the Court has granted a waiver of most of his child support
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obligation which exceeded the children's SSDI payments from October 2001 through August
2004. Because there were some additional periods SSDI paid for the children before this Court
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started crediting him, no interest on delinquent child support prior to October 2001 shall be
^warded to Debra Meenderink.
34.

The Court also accepts Debra Meenderink's explanation that she had mistakenly

{calculated earlier claims of child support owing which she filed with the Court, but finds she did
so unintentionally.
35.

Based on the evidence the Court determines that there is an arrearage in child

'support due to the Petitioner in the amount of $17,377.74.
HOME EQUITY:
36.

The Court finds that the parties reached a superceding and overriding agreement

regarding the home equity and Steven Meenderink owes her any unpaid amounts pursuant to that
agreement establishing her equity of $14,500.00 dated August 20, 2002. Many circumstances
changed regarding the home, including occupancy by Steven Meenderink and the Court find that
agreement was reasonable. Steven Meenderink agreed to take over the payments on the home and
be responsible for the home.
TAXES & IRS OBLIGATIONS:
37.

The parties should be held equally responsible for the amount of taxes calculated

to be owing which arose while the parties were married. Credits must be given for the amounts
withheld or deducted from Debra Meenderink^ subsequent tax returns. She should not be
required to pay any penalties or interest chargeable on Steven Meenderink's portion of the
obligation. There should be no obligation to Debra Meenderink for interest or penalties that have
arisen from Steven Meenderink's failure to include 1099 income in the tax returns if filed after
the parties separated although she would be obligated for the normal taxable amount had the 1099
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Meenderink harmless from any future tax deductions against her except for basic tax amounts she
might otherwise owe under this ruling so long as she has fully paid what is owed by her on a
timely basis.
CO

\

MEDICAL EXPENSES:
38.

Although Debra Meenderink's claims for medical expenses have been submitted

[later than provided in the decree, tardiness is not always equal to forgiveness. The obligations for
Steven Meenderink to pay his portion of those legitimate medical expenses still exist in this case,
notwithstanding whether Debra Meenderink or her father paid them for the children's benefit
However, because of her tardiness he does not have to pay interest to Debra Meenderink or her
father on those amounts.
39.

Both parties have failed, in at least some regard, to fully comply with timely

actions in certain aspect of this case, but both should be cautioned that in the future, the Court
will expect more diligent compliance. Based on the evidence the Court finds the Vi of the
children's medical expenses which the Petitioner or her father have paid and are entitled to be
reimbursed are $3,337.43.
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS:
40.

As the Court has alluded to above, Steven Meenderink should have been more

compelled and diligent in pursuing good employment. Respondent filed for modification and has
caused most of the attorney's fees and expenses incurred herein. This Court had issued several
beneficial rulings on his behalf and he abused this leniency by failing to do his part to resolve the
issues presented and decided by this Court. Respondent must get moving toward substantial
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employment immediately. Respondent will be able to pay reasonable attorney's fees. Debra
Meenderink is still working to obtain greater financial independence with better employment and
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as presently unable to anticipate substantially greater income to meet costs and attorney's fees
{incurred herein.
41.

Steven Meenderink should be ordered to pay Debra Meenderink's reasonable

[attorney's fees and costs which based on the affidavit of counsel and offsetting such for the fees
already awarded based on the discovery sanctions are $8,917.50.
42.

The Court finds based on the trial evidence that the fees incurred by the Petitioner

lare reasonable and Petitioner has a definite need and is unable to pay the attorney fees without
assistance. Conversely based on the previous findings the Court finds that the Respondent has
the ability to earn a substantial income and to pay the Petitioner's fees which she has incurred in
defending his unsuccessful attempt to permanently lower his child support obligation.
43.

Any conclusion of law set forth below which would more appropriately be

classified a finding of fact is incorporated herein by this reference. Conversely any finding of
fact set forth above^ych would more appropriately be classified a conclusion of law is to be
incorporated in the Conclusions of Law section below.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has reviewed this case very carefully to fully consider the important

potential issue arising from Mr. Meenderink's (Steven) claim of disability and inability to work.
Respondent does have a disability. Under all the facts of this case, his disability, coupled with
his claim that this Court should take into consideration his ex-wife's (Debra Meenderink) present
ability to work and earn, do not in the Court's opinion constitute a substantial material change of
circumstances which would justify this Court's elimination or reduction of his original child
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support obligation.
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2.

5

The Court concludes that there have been some changes in circumstances affecting

jMr. Meenderink's health. However, the Court has granted him more than adequate opportunity to
obtain further college or rehabilitative education to mitigate his somewhat worsened health
condition. The purpose of temporarily suspending his child support obligation and allowing a
lesser amount of child support to the approximate amount of child benefit paid by SSDI was to
[permit additional education and rehabilitation so he could obtain substantial comparable
employment to that which existed at the time of the divorce. After considering all the facts, the
Court does not find, on balance, a substantial material change of circumstances that were
reasonably unforeseeable or unpredictable at the time of divorce. The original child support
obligation should not be disturbed.
3.

The Court concludes that it is equitable that Respondent should pay the

petitioner's reasonable attorney fees to be set by the Court by affidavit and if disputed then to be
determined following a hearing.
4.

The Court also concludes that it is equitable for Respondent to pay the taxes as

determined above in Finding 37.
5.

The Court concludes that based upon the forgoing findings judgment for lA of the

children's medical expenses should be entered against the Respondent and in favor of the
Petitioner in the amount of $3,337.43.
6.

The Court concludes that based upon the forgoing findings judgment for lost home

equity should be entered against the Respondent and in favor of the Petitioner in the amount of
$14,500.00, as of the date it was signed.
Harris, Preston
4 cnamders, P.C.
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah 84321 j
(435)752-3551

Meenderink Findings of Facts & Conclusions of Law

Page 12

1.

The Court concludes that based upon the forgoingfindingsjudgment for attorney

{fees should be entered against the Respondent and in favor of the Petitioner in the amount of
j$8,917.50.
8.

The Court concludes that based upon the forgoing findings judgment for Income

[Taxes should be entered against the Respondent and in favor of the Petitioner in the amount of
|$(X0(X
9.

The Court further concludes that based on the forgoing findings that it is equitable

that the Respondent hold and save Petitioner harmless from any future tax obligation incurred as
found in paragraph 37 except for basic tax amounts she might otherwise owe under this ruling so
long as she has fully paid what is owed by her on a timely basis.
10.

Any conclusion of law set forth above which would more appropriately be

classified a finding of fact is incorporated therein by this reference. Conversely any finding of
fact set forth above which would more appropriately be classified a conclusion of law is to be
incorporated as a conclusion of law herein.
DISTRICT COUI
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Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, postage prepaid to Respondents5 attorney, Catherine F. Labatte, P.O. Box
159, Centerville, Utah 84014 dated this *$? day of February 2005.
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Uoseph M. Chambers (0612)
ScCONO DISTRICT COURT
(HARRIS, PRESTON & CHAMBERS
Attorneys for Petitioner
2205 APR 18 P f> no
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DEBRA MEENDERINK,

*
*

Petitioner,
vs.
STEVEN MEENDERINK,
Respondent.

*
*
*
*

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION
TO MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE
AND JUDGMENT
,

Civil No. 974901209
Judge Roger S. Dutston

tf*
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This matter came before the Court for trial upon the Respondent Steven Meenderink 's Petition
to Modify the Decree of Divorce based on allegations that there has been a substantial change of
circumstance that would justify this Court's elimination or reduction of his original child support
obligation. The Petitioner, Debra Meenderink, appeared and was represented by her attorney Joseph
M. Chambers, Logan, Utah. The Respondent was present and represented by his attorney Catherine
R Labatte, Centerville, Utah. Trial occurred over a period of one day on April 21, 2004, After
receiving the evidence and subsequent memorandafromthe parties' attorneys and the Court having
fully considered the matter and entered its Memorandum Decision dated August 31,2004, the Court
now enters the following order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED & DECREED:
1.

The petition to modify the Decree of Divorce is hereby dismissed based on the

Court's findings that there has not been a substantial change of circumstances.
2.

The Petitioner Debra Meenderink be awarded a judgment against said Respondent,

Steven Meenderink, in the amount of:
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$ 1,914.79

as and for delinquent child support for the year 1999 to December 3 i, 2004

$ 6,160.02

as and for delinquent child support for the year 2000 to December 31, 2004

$ 5,557.98

as and for delinquent child support for the year 2001 to December 31, 2004

5?

$

0,00

as and for delinquent child support for the year 2002 to December 31, 2004

$

252.81

as and for delinquent child support for the year 2003 to December 31, 2004

$ 3,492.14

as and for delinquent child support for the year 2004 to December 31, 2004

$17,377.74

Total Child Support Judgment as of December 31, 2004

$8,917.50

Attorney's Fees, per §38-9-4 (2) ILC.A., to the date of this judgment plus the
amount of augmented attorneys fees and such sums in addition thereto as
Petitioner may incur in attorney's fees in enforcing and collecting this judgment
and make proof thereof to this court hereafter.

$ 14,500.00

as and for equity lost in the home

$ 3,337.43

as and for one-half medical expenses

$44,132.67

TOTAL JUDGMENT

with interest on the total judgment at the rate of4.77 % percent effective from the date of this judgment
until paid, plus after accruing coste.
DATED this j ^ - d a y of ft#raary, 2005
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DISMISSING
PETITION TO MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE AND JUDGMENT, postage prepaid, to
Respondent's attorney, Catherine F. Labatte, 500 North Marketplace Drive, Suite 201, Centerville,
Utah 84014, dated this ff^ay of February, 2005.
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